UNU Update: Has the UN found the right formula for promoting democracy

Edward Newman is Director of Studies on Conflict and Security in UN University's Peace and Governance Programme. Roland Rich is director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions at Australian National University. This commentary appears in the current edition of UN Chronicle. The authors are editors of the book, The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality, published by UNU Press.
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The ideal of democratic governance underpins much of the contemporary work of the UN. The founding of the Organization, in addition to being an alliance against aggression, was premised upon the belief that stable, peaceful conditions within states underpin peaceful and stable relations between states. Almost half of the UN’s members have requested the organization’s assistance in conducting elections. But an election does not necessarily resolve deep seated problems, particularly when some of the situations in which the UN finds itself facilitating or promoting democracy – such as East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan – are societies deeply traumatized by conflict.

Democracy promotion and assistance is a challenging field of activity and a range of difficult questions are raised: Can the UN help to build the foundations of democracy and have a substantive positive impact upon the development of democratic governance inside societies? In other words, can external actors bring democracy where there had been no democracy? Has the promotion of democracy in post-conflict and divided societies had a significant role in conflict settlement and reconciliation? Are top-down government-assistance programmes the most effective, or those that work with civil society and non-governmental groups? Are ‘international standards’ of democracy and democratization sensitive to indigenous traditions and authority structures?

The range of democracy assistance activities is wide. It covers organizing, conducting and validating elections; developing civil society and political parties; bolstering the rule of law, judicial institutions and security architecture; strengthening accountability, oversight and transparency; enhancing legislative training and effectiveness; and civic education and protecting human rights. Bottom-up democracy assistance focuses on strengthening civil society, public awareness and the capacity for societal deliberation It is often implemented through local and international non-government actors. In contrast, top-down assistance is implemented through governments and concentrates more on formal institutions and processes.

The UN is involved in all such approaches. The normative basis for such activities is also wide ranging, including the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other major human rights instruments. Until relatively recently these legal instruments did not imply an international democratic entitlement or a mandate for democracy promotion. However the end of the Cold War opened up political space and an increased opportunity to address both democracy and human rights issues at the international level, and a growing acceptance of a wider conception of peace and security which includes issues of governance inside states.

Lessons, observations and precautions

We must be realistic about what we can expect any international actor to achieve in terms of democracy promotion. It is reasonable to suggest that people everywhere have an inherent desire to have at least some control over their lives. Having a say in the organization of their communities would therefore seem to be a universal human desire. If the UN is facilitating this process, then it is quite possible for the organization to have a significant impact in helping a society move forward to democracy. But the conditions under which the UN works are of critical importance. The modest progress towards consolidated democracy in many of the countries in which the UN has been involved – such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, and, although not a state, Kosovo – seems to support this cautious conclusion. The social and economic context, the security situation and the policies and attitudes of powerful political actors are decisive factors. Yet even when democratic ‘convergence’ occurs, democracy does not necessarily take root because of inadequate capacity and institutions, lack of trust, and lack of resources. This is where the UN and other external actors can have an enduring impact.

Democratic processes can be expensive; it is important that the systems and processes that the UN supports in developing countries are not beyond the means of such countries. The 1994 transition elections in Mozambique cost $64.5m, provided mainly by 17 donors and amounting to a staggering 4.4% of the country’s GDP. There have been concerns that international democracy assistance is donor-lead and donor-dependent, that it ignores the issues of affordability and long-term sustainability. Emphasis should be attached to more modest bottom-up, demand-driven assistance.

The UN’s approach to democracy assistance is sensitive to cultural peculiarities as well as, generally, politically impartial. The UN pursues its work with a view to building the capacity of communities to develop their own forms of participation and collective decision-making, in the context of indigenous social conditions. Yet no form of intervention is value free. All substantial forms of intervention have an impact upon the future of a political community – if not, there would be no point in undertaking them. The concepts of national representation, equality, individual rights of citizenship, and secular and accountable forms of civil authority are premised upon the liberal vein of democracy. In some settings, this is a departure from traditional structures, including familial, clan, and religious authority. We should not shy away from the fact that building democracy may require deep changes in societies and disruptions in the status quo, a process that can attract significant domestic opposition.

The impact of external actors upon local politics is one of the most difficult questions relating to democracy promotion and assistance. In managing the local political situation inside a target state, UN actors and the international community in general are faced with the conundrum of influencing local politics to allow the people to have a proper choice. Most people in this field would recognize that it is not simply the process that matters, but also the results. Ideally, the design of the process will marginalize militants and encourage pluralism and inclusive politics. The UN can be in a difficult position as it deals with local political actors, some of which may have dubious democratic credentials but are armed and thus cannot be ignored. The UN needs to draw on decades of experience in peacemaking and peacekeeping as well as on its global authority to take the decisions that will achieve its mandate. As is so often the case in such situations, short-term objectives will inevitably triumph over longer-term goals. Cambodia’s UNTAC-drafted Constitution foresaw the problem of winner-take-all processes in post civil war situations and required a two-thirds majority for government formation. This solved the immediate problem of not triggering a return to war but the provision has plagued Cambodia’s democracy ever since.

Amongst the actors involved in democracy assistance and promotion the UN can find itself in the position of supporting various activities which may not all be perfectly complementary, especially in post-conflict societies. For example, the democracy that Burundi experienced – including the elections of 1993 – had a questionable impact at that time. Indeed, elections may well have played a role in the ensuing instability and violence because they exacerbated an atmosphere of divisive political competition in a tense social environment. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah served as the UN Secretary-General’s special representative for Burundi between 1993 and 1995. He reflected that “majority rule simply could not be sustained given the realities of Burundi’s political and security situation”, and “in many African countries the introduction of democracy should be allied with a ten- to twenty-year transitional period of constitutional power sharing. Democratic habits and traditions are not formed overnight.” Whilst this may be unduly pessimistic, the challenges of building meaningful democracy in societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the short term are demonstrable. To ignore these challenges and insist upon democracy prematurely brings enormous risks.

There is often pressure from the international community for countries in which the UN is involved to move towards democracy as a matter of priority, as if this is an end in itself. However, there is evidence that this can be in tension with other public needs – such as peace-building, reconciliation, efficient provision of public services, perhaps even economic reconstruction – especially in conflict and post-conflict situations. Ill-timed or poorly designed elections in delicate political situations can be hazardous – as the experience of Angola and Burundi demonstrates. They can exacerbate existing tensions, result in support for extremists or encourage patterns of voting that reflect war time allegiances, as in Bosnia.

In Iraq, elections may be divisive: they will highlight political, religious and ethnic divisions. They could also exacerbate the insurgency, because the insurgents resist any public initiative organized under what they claim is an illegitimate interim government, because they fear that a successful election will further marginalize them, and because they judge that the inherent volatility of an election campaign in such circumstances will be a conducive environment for one of their goals: to foment civil war.

But there are significant benefits to holding elections even when the circumstances are not ideal: they are a step towards democracy and form a milestone in the post-conflict transition. They strengthen the sense of ‘ownership’ amongst the public concerning the country’s political destiny, something which is desperately needed. Most importantly, elections will marginalize the extremists as most political actors – including some radical groups – participate in the political process and turn their backs upon violence.

How then to balance the impulse and pressure for democracy with local realities? Whatever the balance, promoting and assisting democracy in post-conflict situations is ambitious and sometimes hazardous. We must be aware of the limitations of such an exercise and the UN, for its part, must be wary of unrealistic mandates. But it is nevertheless condemned to take on the most difficult cases the world has to offer.